Managing or Celebrating Linguistic Diversity in the E.U.?

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INTRODUCTION

It is far too early to understand the vast number of effects of the May 1, 2004 expansion of the European Union, especially when considering democratic legitimacy, language policies and linguistic diversity. But there are at least two linguistic issues within the academic literature that seem to have already become clear: one has to do with the permanency of the official and working languages framework and the other issue concerns how to understand the spread of English and its meaning for suprastate democracy.

Prior to this most recent expansion, several scholars argued that it would be almost impossible to alter the official languages framework of the EU whereby one major language of each member state becomes an ‘official and working’ language of the EU’s institutions, equal, at least officially, to all the rest. They argued that it does not matter how cumbersome and expensive such a multilingual regime might be. Because the Treaty of Rome stipulates that the language policies of the institutions must be decided unanimously by the Council of Ministers coupled with the symbolic importance of language means that the 1958 regulation making Dutch, French, German and Italian ‘official and working languages’ with equal status became the unassailable model whereby every member state’s major language becomes and ‘official and working’ language of the EU (Loos 2000, Krauss 2000, and De Swaan 2001: 167-71).

The increase from 11 to 20 official and working languages lends further support to this argument especially the specific situation of Maltese that will be discussed below. Here I will argue that expansion raises the tension between whether the EU celebrates linguistic diversity in general or just the limited diversity of the ‘official’ EU languages. This latter situation can fall easy prey to critics who see ‘official’ language status as merely symbolic, overly bureaucratic and wasteful. This ‘official’ version of multilingualism may be seen not as an integral element of democratic representation but instead be merely the outcome of the crass politics of federating nation-states of vastly different sizes. In order to adequately justify EU multilingualism, its rationale from a democratic perspective must match how it operates. The most recent expansion suggests the opposite may be happening. And this, I will argue, is important for the real and perceived democratic process of the EU.

The second, related, argument is about the prevalence of academic arguments specifically in favour of adopting English as a lingua franca. The implication is that an increase in the number of official EU languages complements the continued spread of English – as Abram De Swaan

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phrases it, “the more languages, the more English.” Moreover, there is an implicit or explicit position that this poses no problems for the development of democracy at an EU level. Many argue that the spread of English is not a challenge to EU multilingualism, both official and quotidian. To take just one example, Philippe Van Parijs argues that English should be adopted as Europe’s lingua franca because “we need a way of communicating directly and intensively across the [nation-state] borders drawn by the differences of our mother tongues, without the extremely expensive and constraining mediation of competent interpreters. We need it in particular if we do not want Europeanisation, and beyond it globalisation, to be the exclusive preserve of the wealthy and the powerful who can afford quality interpretation.” (Van Parijs 2004: 117). More descriptive and ‘objective’ assessments less concerned with justice and fairness as Van Parijs also paint a picture of the inevitable dominance of English that seems irrational to resist. Whereas before 2000, there was relatively scant academic work in this area, especially from political scientists, now such literatures are burgeoning and this specific line of argument is one prominent theme.

This article argues that many such arguments that support the adoption of English as a lingua franca for Europe utilize a rarified notion of language that ignores the history of language within the rise of the modern nation-state and democracy. If the decision to adopt English as a lingua franca results from forces outside democratic will formation, it will only exacerbate the democracy deficit. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the EU has been increasingly adopting policies that celebrate and foster linguistic diversity – however vague or ineffectual they might be. Some of these policies are the outcome of processes that are at least struggling to be democratic and related to questions of human rights, overcoming ‘democracy deficits’ and voter malaise. In other words, while some scholars and the EU Treaties themselves tend to downplay the tensions around the possibilities of suprastate democracy and language, these challenges seem to be at the heart of the European project. As Robert Phillipson argues, “Uncertainty about supranational language policy reflects uncertainty about the type of political entity that the EU is evolving into, and the relative fragility of channels of communication uniting people and civil society beyond national borders” (Phillipson 2003: 13).

CONTEXT

In 1993, Abram de Swaan described the process and debates on European integration like this:

There was much talk of milk pools and butter mountains, of a unitary currency, of liberalizing movements of EC citizens and restricting access for outsiders, but the language in which these issues were dealt with remained itself a non-issue. (De Swaan 1993: 244)

He noted in both 1998 and 2001 that this situation had not meaningfully changed. The second part of this paper will address the rise, since about 2000, of academic interest in language and the European Union, especially from political scientists. De Swaan was clearly correct that in the 1980s and early to mid-90s, those who studied language in Europe were mostly linguists, sociolinguists, or historians and not political scientists or policy analysts. As De Swaan notes,
political scientists and the large field of European integration was quite slow to address the language issues.

This pattern seems to mirror the EU’s own silence about language policy followed by more recent explicit statements that endorse ‘linguistic diversity’ – although the actual meaning of this concept remains vague. Since its beginnings in 1957, what developed into the EU has restricted its explicit language policy to its own institutions and their workings. It had officially left the field of language to the jurisdiction of its member states (Phillipson 2003: 9-10; Truchot 2003: 101-2; Ives 2004: 26-37). Moreover, the language policies of the institutions such as the European Council, the Commission and the Parliament were understood as separate and separable from general language policy. It was not until the late 1990s that the wider impacts of the EU’s language policies were recognized.

However, since before Maastricht, programmes on education and culture entered the domain of quotidian language use of European citizens. Programmes concerning education, such as Lingua started in 1989 and Erasmus that began in 1987, were aimed at foreign language teachers and students studying in other EU countries, respectively, and thus entered the realm of language policy. Moreover, their explicit goals were to enhance the knowledge not of all languages in Europe, but of the ‘official’ EU languages. Since the late 1990s, the EU has become increasingly explicit about its commitment to fostering multilingualism and knowledge of ‘Europe’s’ languages. These goals are now understood as inextricable from essential elements of European integration, including mobility and political identity. (Phillipson 2003: p.4: Truchot 2003: 106).

THE AMBIGUITY OF LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

The relatively recent trend to celebrate and help foster Europe’s linguistic diversity has added to the ambiguity around what ‘linguistic diversity’ means and the justifications for why it should be celebrated. It is even unclear which languages count as ‘Europe’s languages’. The Socrates Programme is quite interesting in that in phase 1 (1995-1999) it was restricted to official EU languages. Applicants to the programme explicitly noted that funds for components of the projects in languages that are not ‘official’ must come from elsewhere. Socrates phase 2 (2000-2006), however, includes languages other than ‘official’ EU languages (Ives 2004: 40). But this trend of an opening up of what constitutes ‘linguistic diversity’ is presented in a rather vague and unclear fashion. I’ll give two examples. The first is again from the Socrates Programme.

The Decision establishing phase 2 of Socrates states as one of its measures the “promotion of language skills and understanding of different cultures.” There is no clarification or restriction to define these different cultures as the cultures of the majority communities in member states (OJ 2000: 3). Whereas the initial goals of the programme are slightly more clearly restrictive, “to promote a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the knowledge of the languages of the European Union, in particular those languages which are less widely used and less widely
taught, so as to lead to greater understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the European Union and promote the intercultural dimension of education” (OJ L028 3.2.2000: 1, emphasis added). Here linguistic diversity is narrowed to the ‘languages of the European Union’ but it is unclear whether this means ‘official languages’ or any language autochthonous to European Union member states, or any language used by a considerable number of people inside the EU, which would then include Hindi, Arabic and Chinese. Interestingly enough, in its application, Socrates phase 2 includes Icelandic which, arguably, does not fit any of the above categories, but not Hindi. The unstated assumption presumably has something to do with the historical roots of Iceland and Icelandic in Europe. But such presumptions have ambiguous implications that are not necessarily democratic. Socrates 2 does include Turkish.

The second example of ambiguity over the meaning of ‘linguistic diversity’ comes from the new proposed Constitution. In one sense, the Constitution just combines the existing Treaty arrangements regarding official and working languages. However, in so doing, it perhaps potentially changes the official and working language structure by introducing a new designation, ‘languages of the Constitution’. These are the ‘official and working languages’ plus Irish. In the text, Irish is no different from any of the other ‘languages of the Constitution,’ leading some activists in Ireland to renew calls for it to be made an official EU language. In practical terms, does this include Turkish which is an official language of Cyprus, as will be discussed below, and the mother tongue of well over two million residents of Germany.

It is also important to see how it frames how the “Union will respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity ...”(Article I-3). Article III-182, paragraph 2a calls for the EU to have a role in “developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States.” Again, it is unclear whether this means the ‘official’ EU languages or autochthonous European languages, or any languages used by a sizeable community within EU members. It also states that in “fulfilling the objective of respecting the Union’s rich cultural and linguistic diversity as set out in paragraph 3 of Article I-3” translations of the Treaty [i.e. the Constitution] into “any other languages as determined by the Member States among these which, in accordance with their constitutional order, enjoy official status in all or part of their territory” will be certified and archived by the Council (Article IV-10, paragraph 2).

Thus, it appears that the proposed Constitution of the European Union includes only the ‘official’ or ‘Constitutional’ languages, and not even all official state languages, let alone languages that are the primary language of millions of EU citizens but not state-languages. This raises a significant question as to what is the democratic justification for this conception of linguistic diversity. If this is the case, the critics of the EU’s multilingualism have a much stronger case in that it is not based in democratic values but instead in the history of political negotiations with little over arching rationale. However, there seems to be a growing trend within the EU to celebrate linguistic diversity and expand its meaning in a direction that does address questions of democratic representation.

Given the trend towards recognizing the importance of linguistic diversity as seen in the changes
to Socrates between the 1st and 2nd phases noted above, the 2001 Year of Languages, 26 of September Day of Languages and the like, it is not surprising that the 2004 expansion from 15 to 25 member states increased the number of official languages from 11 to 20. Each new member, with the exception of Cyprus, added a new ‘official and working’ language to the EU constellation. However, this increase in number of translations is exponential dictated by the formula: $n^2 - n$ where $n$ is the number of languages. This yields a total number of language pairs prior to the latest expansion of $11^2 - 11 = 110$ and now $20^2 - 20 = 380$. As of May 1, 2004, there are more than three times as many language pairs that require translation to and from. This is clearly why there was speculation prior to expansion that either the general framework would break down or at least a language like Maltese would be given the status of Irish, Letzeburgesh or Catalan which have some recognition but not equal status. The major Treaties, for example, have official Irish translations, but not other legislation. This was not the case however, and Maltese became an EU language on par with the other 19.

The importance of Maltese becoming an ‘official and working’ language of the EU is not ‘merely’ symbolic but has economic and social repercussions for Malta. Joseph Eynaud, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Malta, explains that this is a “unique opportunity and a historical moment” for the Maltese language. He explains that “Malta never had the tradition of having specific courses for translators and interpreters.... Usually, we used to translate in other foreign languages like from English into French or Italian and never into Maltese.” Thus, the status of official EU language for Maltese creates a need for Maltese interpreters and translators and the creation of a whole field of study and learning. (Eynaud quoted by Camilleri 2004; see also MaltaMedia News 2004 and SCIC News Newsletter Nr. 27, May 2004 at http://scic.cec.eu.int/scicnews/2004/040610/news03.htm). Moreover, this includes the development of software and terminology databases that had not existed for Maltese before. This work on what sociolinguists call ‘corpus planning’ was a major element of language ‘standardization’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of languages like French, German and Italian.

Eynaud argues that “Democracy ... is also about multilingualism and the right for everyone to get one’s message through in one’s own native tongue... I think some people in Malta still have a colonial mentality. This is a historical occasion where the Maltese language is a European language. We should be proud of this.” He is concerned that this new status of Maltese will not automatically produce the results that he hopes for. Unless these new courses in interpretation and translation produce qualified professionals and if the Maltese MEPs do not use Maltese, there is a likelihood of a “reverse back to Strickland days when English was the elite language and Maltese the il-lingwa tal-kcina (language of the kitchen).” (As quoted in MaltaMedia News 2004).

This situation seems to throw the fact that Irish and (perhaps more importantly from a numeric standpoint at least) Catalan, Welsh or other minority languages do not have full ‘official and working’ language status into greater relief. If Maltese, with 383,000 speakers, has this status, why not Turkish or Welsh?
Thus, where much of the other news media, especially in England and the U.S., is touting the expense and difficulties associated with this new need for translation and interpretation (Black 2004; Dombey 2004; Underhill 2004) the opportunities that it may open are important and also being phrased in terms of democracy and democratic rights.

The issue of the entrance of Cyprus is perhaps a more complex issue that lies beyond the scope of this article. However, it does raise one clear point and question about the ‘official and working’ languages of the EU. As it stands, Cyprus was the sole new member that did not add a language to the EU language regime. These negotiations are notoriously closed, but presumably the precedent that was followed was that of Austria whose major language, German, had already been an official EU language before Austria entered. Likewise for Cyprus, Greek has been an EU language since Greece’s entrance in 1981. This, of course, ignores the question of Turkish. Article Three of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus declares both Greek and Turkish to be the official languages of the Republic, with no distinction made between them. It was assumed that had the April referendum reuniting Cyprus (the Kofi Annan plan for unification) been accepted, Turkish would have become an EU language. This would not only have had an effect for those Turkish speaking Cypriots, but also the much more numerous Turkish speakers elsewhere in the EU especially Germany. However, this was not to be the case.

Had the negotiations been focused on a future reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, one might have expected Turkish to become the 21st EU language. Moreover, had the rationale behind the EU’s multilingualism been a need to respect cultural diversity or the democratic need for citizens to be able to communicate with the institutions that governed them democratically, one would have thought the large number of Turkish speakers in the EU would have helped Cyprus press for Turkish to be the language that its entrance would have added to the language constellation. As it stands, Turkish speakers throughout Europe will have to wait until Turkey’s candidacy is accepted before Turkish becomes an official EU language.

Both these cases, Malta and Cyprus, show that the one member, one language model is difficult to justify on the criteria that the citizens of nation-states should be able to communicate with the democratic institutions that govern them. This is primarily because it relies on the overly simplistic premise that the nation-state members have a single language that its citizens speak.

**ENGLISH AS A LINGUA FRANCA AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY**

I will now turn to two specific examples of this growing field of analysis by political scientists on the role of language in the EU, the work of Abram De Swaan and Philippe Van Parijs. De Swan’s 2001 book *Words of the World* has a chapter devoted to the European Union. The entire book is based on developing the work of Immanual Wallerstein’s world system theory in the realm of language and various language constellations throughout the world. He attempts to map the relation of languages and their speakers to one another categorizing them as ‘peripheral languages’, central or ‘planetary’ languages, ‘supercentral languages’ and then the category made up only by English, the ‘hypercentral’ language. He adds to this world systems theory of
language model a quantitative and rational choice theory approach to analyze why people choose to learn the languages they do. Working through economic concepts, he defines language as a ‘hypercollective good’ and then applies a quantitative measure of a Q-value to each language. The Q-value is the measure of the communicative potential of a language. So it is an attempt to go beyond just measuring a language by the number of speakers who use or know it, or learned it as a mother tongue. Rather a Q-value is “the product of the proportion of those who speak it among all speakers in [their language] constellation and the proportion of multilingual speakers whose repertoire includes the language among all multilingual speakers in the constellation.” (De Swaan 2001: 21). Thus, he approaches language learning from the perspective of individual rational actors and assumes that people will choose to learn the language with the larger Q-value, or the larger communicative potential. This model, he argues, is successful at explaining why English became dominant in India whereas in Indonesia bahasa Indonesian triumphed. He applies the Q-value framework to two regions in Africa and also South Africa as well as the European Union.

His findings on the EU are perhaps not surprising. He argues that English has by far the highest Q-value and thus, people are learning English and rationally they will continue to which will increasingly function as EU’s lingua franca. But he also predicts that because the other national languages, especially French, German, Italian and Spanish, have such strong support through national education policies, etc..., that they will continue to be strong and robust ‘supercentral’ or ‘central’ languages.’ Indeed, relative to the other languages that he looks at, many of which are ‘peripheral’ languages, there is little cause for concern about the increase of English as a lingua franca. Moreover, by pitting the tension in an easy contrast between “maintaining a multiplicity of languages and improving communication in the Union”, he implies that the increase of English as a lingua franca has definite advantages for the EU and its prospects for a vibrant democracy (De Swaan 2001: 173). As he sums up in the subtitle to his chapter on the EU, ‘the more languages, the more English.’

Before commenting on De Swaan’s approach and findings, I’ll summarize the quite different arguments of Philippe Van Parijs that yields some similar outcomes, specifically, the emphasis on the inevitability of English as a lingua franca and the problems that this solves for democracy because democracy requires communication among citizens for which linguistic diversity is a barrier. Van Parijs has written five articles and book chapters since 2000 on language in the European Union. I certainly cannot do them all justice here, but will highlight one specific theme that runs through them all.

Unlike De Swaan, Van Parijs is specifically focused on linguistic justice and redressing linguistic injustice. While he agrees with De Swaan about the inevitability of the spread of English and its usefulness as a lingua franca, he is much more concerned with its costs and other injustices as well. Many of his most interesting and provocative points are attempts to reconcile what he sees as both the unavoidable fact that English is becoming Europe’s lingua franca and what he calls the ‘wisdom’ of making such a decision with the equally clear fact that it is unfair and unjust (Van Parijs 2004: 124). Like De Swaan, Van Parijs borrows heavily from both rational choice
theory and economics to argue that English speakers gain disproportionately from the adoption of English as a lingua franca and non-English speakers who pay an unfair price in the time and resources it takes to learn English as well as the on-going difficulties of perhaps not speaking as well or as comfortably as mother-tongue speakers.

Van Parijs makes creative recommendations such as the banning of dubbing, making sure English language material on the internet is not restricted (i.e. not enforcing any form of intellectual property rights), and take ownership of English as a global language not the property of England or the US (Van Parijs 2004). He also argues that “ritual, sometimes ceremonial, affirmation of the equality of all recognized languages” is important (Van Parijs 2004: 143) and echoing Jean Laponce’s argument, that national languages need to remain “King,” as he puts it, in a defined territory (Van Parijs 2004: 143-5). He also argues provides a qualified argument in favour of granting non-English languages strong laws within given territories (i.e. “impos[ing] public education in local languages...”, “impos[ing] the use of local languages in the political realm...” and “impos[ing] administrative and judiciary procedures in local languages”).(Van Parijs, 2004: 145).

But what shapes all these proposals is his commitment to the position that English should be adopted as Europe’s lingua franca because “we need a way of communicating directly and intensively across the [nation-state] borders drawn by the differences of our mother tongues, without the extremely expensive and constraining mediation of competent interpreters. We need it in particular if we do not want Europeanisation, and beyond it globalisation, to be the exclusive preserve of the wealthy and the powerful who can afford quality interpretation.” (Van Parijs 2004: 117).

Here I will just make two objections that apply to both De Swaan and Van Parijs analyses. The first has to do with the inevitability of the spread of English and its use as a lingua franca (the connection between these two propositions should really be analyzed in greater detail, but this is not the time) as well as its connection to democracy and democratic process. I do not want to argue for or against the wisdom or justice of adopting English as a lingua franca. Rather, I want to ask that such decisions be made by a process that is as democratic as possible. De Swaan and Van Parijs would perhaps note that individuals choosing which language to learn is a democratic process. But this would be to ignore the context and constraints under which individuals make such decisions. It would be to treat language as a private good not a public or ‘hyperc痈ctive’ good as both De Swaan and Van Parijs agree it is. In other words, it seems to me that if we want to use this terminology of ‘goods,’ language’s status as a collective entity places it in a category where we choose to learn it under very special conditions such as schooling systems and especially our notions of political community.’ To make this point allow me to digress a little.

In 1868, one of the most famous modern Italian writers, Alessandro Manzoni, was appointed head of a government commission to spread ‘standard’ Italian throughout the newly unified country of Italy. Had he adopted the explanatory methods of De Swaan and Van Parijs, or their assumptions about language and how people come to learn languages, the Italian language and perhaps Italy, would look quite different than it does today. Most historian of the Italian
language estimate that at that time somewhere between two and ten percent of Italians could speak or understand anything that could be considered ‘Italian.’ (De Mauro 1986; Moss 2000). But rather than ask what language these new Italian citizens would rationally choose to learn as autonomous, individual rational choice actors, Manzoni set about turning the spoken bourgeois dialect of Florence into the ‘standard’ language of the nation.

Manzoni not so much ‘standardized’ Italian as actually created a national language that was related to, but certainly not synonymous with, the literary Italian of the great tradition of Italian writers from Dante forward. Just as he had done with his classic novel, The Betrothed, Manzoni created a new national language by taking the spoken language of bourgeois Florence as a model for all of Italy. Under his plan, dictionaries and grammars were created and perhaps most importantly as we think about the EU’s programmes like Socrates and Leonardo, the school teachers for all of Italy were to be recruited from Tuscany. There is debate about the extent that the actual creation of a standard Italian followed his plan, how much the standard language was actually changed and whether military service and later the radio and TV had greater impact.  

My point is that the crucial development in most European nation-states included a language policy that cannot be explained or understood from a rational choice individualistic perspective. The ‘inevitability’ of a national Italian language had little to do with the types of assumptions De Swaan and Van Parijs are making about language change and democracy, and everything to do with the model set by other European nation-states, most notably France and England. Both De Swaan and Van Parijs seem to use an individualistic rational choice model to explain away rather than explain the spread of English. Their analyses become part of the self-fulfilling prophecy since at the individual level one is only reasonable if she conforms to what she is being told is inevitable anyway. This is most obvious in how the media interpreted the 2001 Eurobarometer survey of languages in the EU. As I have noted elsewhere, the Economist translates the data that 41% of non-British EU citizens ‘know’ English into the statement “English is the EU’s lingua franca... the European mother tongue.” (as discussed in Ives 2004: 37-8).

No such analysis would have lead a Sicilian to learn ‘standard’ Italian in 1870, or predict that such a language would emerge. Rather, in both the 19th century Italian case and our contemporary European case, the explanations have much more to do with the social frameworks (schools, businesses, newspapers, etc....) and the political decisions that help structure the language or languages in which they operate. These decisions can be less democratic (as in most of the cases in 18th and 19th century European nation-states) or more democratic (as some of the decisions about EU language policy seem to be heading). That is not to say that the analyses of De Swaan and Van Parijs do not lead to some useful findings. First off, they have been important in placing language politics in a more prominent place. Secondly, they break down the stalemate between linguistic parochialism (and its worst variation, linguistic nationalism) and a naive approach to language as purely a vehicle of communication (see Ives 2004a). Thirdly, they provide some important analytical concepts for thinking through language issues. However, my concern is that they do not grapple with the actual complexity of what language is and how it relates to democracy.
This is one reason why I am much more concerned with the EU as a potential model for other supranational democratic organizations. And this is why its pronouncements on the importance of linguistic diversity in the face of a globalizing English seem to me to be more than just ‘ritual’ or ‘symbolic’ statements.

My second point is more of a question. It seems to me that the rise of an unprecedented modern democracy in 18th and 19th century Europe went hand in hand with a dramatic linguistic shift from a hierarchy of different languages and dialects for different spheres of life but also different social classes. Most of the major ideologues committed to forging modern nation-states were convinced of the need for national languages often for military and economic reasons as well as democratic and social ones. The question that I think is not being posed, and is actually obscured by the work of many political scientists who are finally turning to the question of language in the EU is this: does this new shift to democracy above the level of the nation-state also entail a different role for language within democratic institutions?

In Umberto Eco’s insightful work, *The Search for the Perfect Language*, he notes how strong the sentiment found in Genesis 11 is, that linguistic diversity is a ‘curse’ and a ‘barrier’ to communication. These presumptions are also found in how both De Swaan and Van Parijs describe linguistic diversity. By tracing various attempts to find the perfect language in the hope of returning human kind to pre-Babelian times, Eco undermines the very premise of such a quest and instead suggests that we would do better to look to Genesis 10 where linguistic diversity is described in a less loaded manner as the mere result of migration across the globe, not God’s punishment of human hubris. While I have problems with his specific descriptions of a polyglot Europe (Eco 1995: 351; see Ives 2004c: 97-9), it leads me to wonder whether the model of translation and interpretation that is just being forged in the EU has more important resonances. Rather than presume, as Van Parijs makes explicit in the passage quoted above, that a single language will enable seamless democratic communication, should we not be realizing that one of the many benefits of linguistic diversity is precisely that it calls our attention to the constant need for translation. Translation among languages becomes a framework and metaphor for translation among diverse communities with differing values and views of the world, for the very type of ‘solidarity’ that Van Parijs has written so much about.

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2 So for example, Danish and now Maltese have ‘official and working’ language status within the EU and Turkish, for example does not. The fact that there are many more Turkish
speakers than Danish or Maltese in the EU has been irrelevant. Moreover, the prevalence of English as a second language in Malta relative to say Turkish speakers in Germany makes the question of citizen’s language rights and political representation even more pronounced.

3 Claude Truchot discusses the various costs involved noting that even the estimation that translation and interpretation accounts for 2% of the total EU budget is probably too high (Truchot 2003: 109).

4 I have argued elsewhere that the official and working languages regime does have an impact on language usage outside the EU institutions themselves, such as in the Socrates programmes (Ives 2004: 33-7).

5 Further complicating such issues is the situation where the EU views language rights and the suppression of language as a human rights issue. The Turkish governments repression of the Kurdish language is often raised as one of the human rights issues that is an obstacle to its entrance into the EU. In a similar but different way, the EU has been quite concerned with the suppression of Russian within Latvia.

6 For a critical review of De Swaan see Robert Phillipson 2004 forthcoming.

7 My point is captured well by Will Kymlicka and François Grin when noting the neglect of language by liberal theory such as John Rawls, “One explanation for this surprising omission is that language turns out to be rather embarrassing for liberals. Issues of language cannot easily be accommodated within the standard framework that liberals adopt for dealing with diversity.” (Kymlicka and Grin 2003: 8). I would argue that this framework includes those fields of economics that both De Swaan and Van Parijs draw heavily.

8 Moreover, Graziadio Isaia Ascoli and Antonio Gramsci were very critical of this method arguing not only that it would be ineffective but worse that by forcing what was in essence a foreign language on especially southern Italians would exacerbate political tensions between north and south. See Ives 2004b: 36-62.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


